SOURCE-LINKED INTELLIGENCE
After the Attacker Leaves: Benchmarking Carryover Attacks on LLM Agents
Modern LLM agents persist state across sessions via two channels: long-lived memory files silently prepended to the system prompt, and scheduled tasks waking the agent without user input. A one-time indirect prompt injection committed to either channel can re-fire across sessions long after the attacker leaves, threats we term carryover attacks. Existing prompt-injection benchmarks evaluate attacks only in the session where malicious content is first observed, leaving the gate governing when and how often a planted payload later re-fires unmeasured. We present CarryoverBench: 12 personal-assis
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Evidence & attribution
- arXiv · AI, language, vision and robotics · 2026-10-20T15:55:05.000Z
First collected: 2026-10-21T10:33:33.027Z. This is not the publication date.