SOURCE-LINKED INTELLIGENCE
GHSA-4xpc-pv4p-pm3w: LiteLLM: Authentication Bypass via Host Header Injection
### Impact A Host-header parsing flaw in the LiteLLM proxy could, under specific conditions, allow unauthenticated access to protected management routes. The auth layer derived the effective route from `request.url.path` in `litellm/proxy/auth/auth_utils.py::get_request_route()`, which Starlette reconstructs from the `Host` header. A crafted `Host` could therefore make the auth gate evaluate a different route from the one FastAPI dispatched. **Most deployments are not affected.** The bypass is blocked by any upstream layer that validates or normalizes `Host`, such as: - a CDN or WAF, such as C
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- recordType
- vulnerability
- status
- active
- evidenceStatus
- reported
- region
- Global
Evidence & attribution
- OSV AI package advisories · 2026-06-16T23:38:26.000Z
- OSV AI package advisories · 2026-06-29T11:50:52.648Z
First collected: 2026-09-20T23:41:51.992Z. This is not the publication date.