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Algorithmic Collusion and the Complexity of Information-Value-Free Equilibria

arXiv · AI, language, vision and robotics · article · Sep 19, 2026 · UTC

A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing to a fixed action. Motivated by the problem of regulating algorithmic collusion, this refinement was introduced by Hartline, Wang, and Zhang [EC'26], who showed that it can be computed in polynomial time in explicitly represented normal-form game. In this paper, we examine the complexity of IVF(C)CEs in succinct games, which model more realistic strategic interactions that feature either many players or exponentially many pure strategies. We first

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