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Runtime Authorization for Resources Acquired by AI Agents
arXiv · AI, language, vision and robotics · article · Sep 13, 2026 · UTC
By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, budget, OAuth, mandate, and fulfillment checks can validate transaction conditions without deciding whether a returned resource may become usable authority. This post-fulfillment activation gap spans tool-mediated creation, inter-agent delegation, and agentic commerce. We present a provenance-bounded runtime authorization architecture. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their actual capabilities from authenticated provider evidence through a ver
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First collected: 2026-09-20T12:21:05.240Z. This is not the publication date.
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2026-09-24T10:22:25.365Z
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AcquireBound: Runtime Authorization for Resources Acquired by AI Agents → Runtime Authorization for Resources Acquired by AI Agents - summary:
By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, budget, OAuth, mandate, and fulfillment checks can validate transaction conditions without deciding whether a returned resource may become usable authority. This post-fulfillment activation gap spans tool-mediated creation, inter-agent delegation, and agentic commerce. We present AcquireBound, a provenance-bounded runtime authorization architecture. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their actual capabilities from authenticated provider evidence → By acquiring compute, credentials, accounts, services, and other agents, autonomous AI agents can introduce new authority into a task. Payment, budget, OAuth, mandate, and fulfillment checks can validate transaction conditions without deciding whether a returned resource may become usable authority. This post-fulfillment activation gap spans tool-mediated creation, inter-agent delegation, and agentic commerce. We present a provenance-bounded runtime authorization architecture. It quarantines acquired outputs, resolves their actual capabilities from authenticated provider evidence through a ver