SOURCE-LINKED INTELLIGENCE
MOLE: Detecting Insider Threats in AI Agents
Model misalignment, prompt injection, or operator misuse could lead AI agents operating frontier-lab accounts to exfiltrate model weights, poison training data, or weaken release gates. Existing benchmarks do not test whether defenders can detect this activity among routine work under a limited review budget. We introduce MOLE, an open benchmark of 150 AI-operated accounts sharing 9 stateful services over 30 workdays, with 12 threats and 8 corpora from four models totaling roughly 20 billion tokens. Of 39 agent models, 72% complete most assigned harmful objectives and agent refusal does not pr
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Evidence & attribution
- arXiv · AI, language, vision and robotics · 2026-09-07T03:04:31.000Z
First collected: 2026-09-20T20:52:10.320Z. This is not the publication date.